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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
DANIEL VERNON STINSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 48408-2020
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR28-20-5770

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Daniel Stinson pled guilty to unlawful possession of firearm, robbery, first degree
murder, attempted first degree murder, and felony eluding.
sentence, with thirty-four years fixed.

He received an aggregate life

On appeal, Mr. Stinson contends that his sentence

represents an abuse of the district court’s discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the
facts. He further contends that the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his
sentence in light of the additional information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On April 16, 2020, law enforcement responded to a carjacking report. (Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.3.) While officers were investigating the theft of the
truck, dispatch reported a shooting. (PSI, p.3.) Apparently, the shooter asked a man to borrow
his cell phone, and the man went inside his house to ask his roommate for a phone. (PSI, p.3.)
The shooter shot the roommate, killing him, and wounded the other man by shooting him in the
shoulder. (PSI, p.4.) The shooter then fled. (PSI, p.4.) The person suspected of committing
these acts was Daniel Stinson. (PSI, p.3.) When interviewed, Mr. Stinson was emotionally “up
and down,” at times nearly in tears and other times appearing angry.

(PSI, pp.38, 41.)

Mr. Stinson later admitted to using methamphetamine prior to the incidents, and cooperated with
law enforcement by describing where he left the firearm so that the officers could retrieve it.
(PSI, pp.4, 399-403.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Stinson was charged by Information with unlawful possession
of a firearm, robbery, aggravated battery, burglary, three counts of concealment of evidence, first
degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and felony eluding a police officer. (R., pp.6469.)

Mr. Stinson was also charged with firearm and persistent violator enhancements.

(R., pp.67-68.)
Mr. Stinson entered into a plea agreement. (R., pp.83-92.) In exchange for his guilty plea
to an amended information charging him with unlawful possession of a firearm, robbery, first
degree murder, attempted first degree murder, felony eluding, and the persistent violator
sentencing enhancement, the State agreed to dismiss the remainder of the charges and the firearm

1

Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
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enhancement. (7/14/20 Tr., p.5, Ls.10-19; R., pp.71-72, 76-78; PSI p.1.) Mr. Stinson entered an
Alford2 plea to the first degree murder and to the attempted first degree murder, but entered
standard pleas of guilty to the rest of the charges in the amended information. (7/14/20 Tr., p.5,
L.6 – p.6, L.4; p.15, L.20 – p.16, L.7; p.19, Ls.1-16; p.25, L.2 – p.26, L.15; R., pp.83-92; PSI,
p.1.)

The plea agreement did not include sentencing recommendations other than a

recommendation for concurrent sentences. (7/14/20 Tr., p.5, Ls.17-19.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to sentence Mr. Stinson to
fixed life. (9/10/20 Tr., p.28, Ls.21-24; p.32, Ls.18-24.) Mr. Stinson’s counsel asked the district
court to sentence Mr. Stinson to life, with fifteen to twenty years fixed. (9/10/20 Tr., p.43,
Ls.20-22.)

The district court sentenced Mr. Stinson to five years fixed for the unlawful

possession of a firearm, to life with fifteen years fixed for robbery, to life with thirty-four years
fixed for first degree murder, to fifteen years fixed for attempted first degree murder, and to five
years fixed on the felony eluding conviction. (9/10/20 Tr., p.49, Ls.8-25; R., pp.121-23.) All of
the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. (R., p.122.)
Mr. Stinson filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.12427.) Mr. Stinson then filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reduce his
sentence. (Aug., pp.1-4.) The district court denied Mr. Stinson’s Rule 35 motion after a hearing.
(1/29/21 Tr., p.5, L.1 – p.14, L. 18; Aug., pp.9-10.) Mr. Stinson filed a notice of appeal timely
from the judgment of conviction and the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.
(R., pp.61-64, 70-73.)

2

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding that a trial court may accept a voluntary
guilty plea, despite a continuing claim by the defendant that he is innocent, when there is a
strong factual basis for the plea, and the defendant understands the charges against him).
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate life sentence, with
thirty-four years fixed, upon Mr. Stinson following his plea of guilty to unlawful
possession of a firearm, robbery, first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and
felony eluding?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Stinson’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Life Sentence, With
Thirty-Four Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Stinson Following His Plea Of Guilty To Unlawful
Possession Of A Firearm, Robbery, First Degree Murder, Attempted First Degree Murder, And
Felony Eluding
Mr. Stinson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his life sentence, with thirty-four
years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
considering the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). In reviewing a trial court’s
decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Mr. Stinson does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision by the exercise of reason, Mr. Stinson must show that in light of the governing criteria,
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the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293,
294 (1997). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Stinson’s sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the trial court must consider a defendant’s mental
illness as a factor at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Stinson has
been diagnosed with PTSD, ADD/ADHD, bipolar disorder, depression, dysthymia, and
schizophrenia/psychotic disorder. (PSI, pp.7, 11; R., p.85.) Mr. Stinson has attempted suicide in
the past, and he experiences suicidal thoughts.3

(PSI, p.7.)

He has been hospitalized at

Intermountain Hospital for approximately eight months. (PSI, pp.7, 205, 243.) Mr. Stinson
experiences auditory hallucinations that become louder when he is angry. (PSI, pp.7, 259.) He
began hearing the voices/whispers when he was about

years old. (PSI,

p.243.) Mr. Stinson has long struggled to obtain the proper mental health medications and/or
medication dosages. (See PSI, pp.223, 353, 356, 368-69.) Mr. Stinson receives Social Security
Disability income for his severe mental illnesses. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Stinson was homeless in the
seven to eight months before he committed these crimes. (PSI, p.12.)
Mr. Stinson is aware that “getting high” contributed to his legal problems. (PSI, p.18.)
He first tried methamphetamine at age

. (PSI, p.10.) When he uses methamphetamine,

the auditory hallucinations seem to lessen for Mr. Stinson. (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Stinson was under the
influence of methamphetamine when the crimes occurred. (PSI, p.5.) He told the substance
3

Mr. Stinson told the substance abuse evaluator, “I told myself not to think of suicide because it
would wreck my mom. I am not going to do that to her.” (PSI, pp.204, 262.)
5

abuse evaluator, “I lost control of my drug use and then lost control of my behavior.” (PSI,
p.204.) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89 (1982). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol
resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating
circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981). Mr. Stinson has shown that he is
able to remain sober, as he maintained sobriety in the community for approximately one year—
after his most recent release from prison. (PSI, p.10.)
Mr. Stinson also has a supportive family. His sister described Mr. Stinson as “always
been a great guy. He is hard working, helpful and caring,” and as someone who “would give the
shirt off his back” in order to help others. (PSI, p.8.) Mr. Stinson’s sister believes his criminal
behavior has stemmed from his substance abuse, which has never been properly addressed. (PSI,
p.9.) The day of Mr. Stinson’s crimes, his sister had planned to drive him to the hospital to
obtain mental health treatment. (PSI, p.65.) Mr. Stinson speaks to his mother daily, while
incarcerated. (PSI, p.9.) He expressed that his mom “means the most to him.” (PSI, p.18.) He
said of their relationship, “I feel very poor over my lifestyle choices. I am close to my mom, but
I lost sight of reality because I used so much meth. My mom is kind, loving, set in her ways, and
we all know not to cross her. The distance between us is because of my lifestyle choices.” (PSI,
p.207.) Mr. Stinson’s mother tried to get help for Mr. Stinson in 2020, shortly before he
committed the crimes; however, Mr. Stinson was twice turned away from Kootenai Behavioral
Health because he was not suicidal. (PSI, p.220.) She describes Mr. Stinson as a very hard
worker. (PSI, p.221.) Mr. Stinson also has weekly telephone calls with his step-mother, another
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source of support. (PSI, p.9.) Mr. Stinson’s ex-girlfriend, Tabitha Hoiland, also wrote a letter in
support of Mr. Stinson. (PSI, pp.404-05.)
Further, Mr. Stinson expressed considerable remorse and accepted responsibility for his
actions. (7/14/20 Tr., p.19, Ls.1-16; 9/10/20 Tr., p.44, L.22 – p.45, L.15; PSI, p.5.) He said he
felt “Shame, guilt, sorrowful” regarding the crimes. (PSI, p.5.)
At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Stinson told the court:
I was messed up on drugs. I’m sorry for what I did. It’s -- damn sorry for what I
did. It’s a horrible thing that happened. It’s a horrible thing that I took something
-- took the way that I did from somebody and then ended up shooting somebody
else. It’s just a horrible thing all the way around. I’m expecting to go to prison
for a term, long-term, but I don’t -- I don’t feel that a fixed life sentence is key.
Yeah, the drugs -- I’ve been messed up on drugs for a long time. I did good, I
was clean for a long time, and then I got -- I don’t know what happened. I just
fell off the wagon and stayed off the wagon and drugs played a huge part of it.
It’s no excuse what I did, but it plays a huge factor in what happened. And I’m
sorry for what I did. I’m sorry to the people. I wish they were here. I was going
-- I wish they were here for me to apologize to. Yeah. That’s all I have to say.
(9/10/20 Tr., p.44, L.22 – p.45, L.15.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a
defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. Shideler,
103 Idaho at 595; State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Stinson asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his family support, severe mental health conditions, and substance abuse, it
would have imposed a less severe sentence.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Stinson’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Sentence Reduction, In Light Of The New Information Offered In Support Of His Rule 35
Motion
Although Mr. Stinson contends that his sentence is excessive in light of the information
in front of the district court at the time of his September 10, 2020 sentencing hearing (see section
I, supra), he asserts that the excessiveness of his sentence is even more apparent in light of the
new information submitted in conjunction with Mr. Stinson’s Rule 35 motion. Mr. Stinson
asserts that the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence modification represents an
abuse of discretion.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of
new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
At the Rule 35 hearing, Mr. Stinson advised the court that he was in administrative
segregation, with almost no human interactions, and he would remain there for at least a year.
(1/29/21 Tr., p.6, L.18 – p.7, L.8.) Ms. Stinson was only able to speak to a clinician twice a
month. (1/29/21 Tr., p.7, Ls.20-25.) Mr. Stinson told the court that, while he was not able to
participate in IDOC programming, he was reading mental health books and attempting to learn
the information on his own. (1/29/21 Tr., p.7, Ls.9-19.) Mr. Stinson has future plans—he wants
to learn a trade such as being an electrician. (1/29/21 Tr., p.9, Ls.22-25.) He plans to continue
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to take his mental health medications and to participate in counseling in preparation for his
release from custody. (1/29/21 Tr., p.9, L.18 – p.10, L.14.) Mr. Stinson’s counsel told the court
that it was important for Mr. Stinson to take his medication and to continue with counseling,
which he had not done previously. (1/29/21 Tr., p.11, Ls.11-17.) The information Mr. Stinson
submitted in support of his Rule 35 motion was new and additional information that was not
before the district court at sentencing. The district court denied Mr. Stinson’s Rule 35 motion
after considering the circumstances surrounding the initial crimes and Mr. Stinson’s prior
criminal record. (1/29/21 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-11.)
Mr. Stinson asked the court to reduce the fixed portion of his sentence by ten to fifteen
years; from thirty-four years, to nineteen to twenty-four years. (1/29/21 Tr., p.9, Ls.4-6.) In
light of Mr. Stinson’s progress in completing programming to better himself, the district court
should have reduced his sentence. Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence
before the district court at the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion
in failing to reduce Mr. Stinson’s sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Stinson respectfully requests that this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence
by ten to fifteen years, to a sentence of nineteen to twenty-four years fixed, plus life
indeterminate. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be vacated
and his case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of May, 2021.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of May, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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